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bstract
In cooperative breeding systems, some individuals help to raise offspring that are not their own. While early explanations for such altruistic
ehaviour were predominantly based on kin selection, recent evidence suggests that direct benefits may be important in the maintenance of
ooperation. To date, however, discussions of cooperative breeding have made little reference to more general theories of cooperation between
nrelated individuals (while these theories rarely address cooperative breeding). Here, we attempt to integrate the two fields. We identify four key
uestions that can be used to categorise different mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperative behaviour: (1) whether or not individuals invest
n others; (2) whether or not this initial investment elicits a return investment by the beneficiary; (3) whether the interaction is direct, i.e. between
wo partners, or indirect (involving third parties) and (4) whether only actions that increase the fitness of the partner or also fitness reducing actions
punishment) are involved in the interaction. Asking these questions with regards to concepts in the literature on cooperative breeding, we found that
a) it is often straightforward to relate these concepts to general mechanisms of cooperation, but that (b) a single term (such as ‘pay-to-stay’, ‘group
ugmentation’ or ‘prestige’) may sometimes subsume two or more distinct mechanisms, and that (c) at least some mechanisms that are thought to
e important in cooperative breeding systems have remained largely unexplored in the theoretical literature on the evolution of cooperation. Future
heoretical models should incorporate asymmetries in power and pay off structure caused for instance by dominance hierarchies or partner choice,
nd the use of N-player games. The key challenges for both theoreticians and empiricists will be to integrate the hitherto disparate fields and to
isentangle the parallel effects of kin and non-kin based mechanisms of cooperation.
1eywords: Cooperative breeding; Evolution; Altruistic behaviour; Reciprocity; Pay-to-stay; Group augmentation; Prestige
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The theory of evolution by Natural Selection appears at
rst glance to predict that individuals will be selfish rather
han cooperative (Darwin, 1859; Fisher, 1930). Despite this,
ooperation is common throughout the animal kingdom and
ccurs both between conspecifics and between heterospecifics.
particularly striking example is cooperative breeding, in
hich individuals help to raise offspring that are not their own
Cockburn, 1998). These ‘helpers’ often (but not always) delay
ispersal, engage in various helping tasks and usually reproduce
elow their potential compared to when breeding independently.
ew examples of cooperation can rival the behaviour of sterile
orkers in eusocial insects, which completely forego the chance
o reproduce and often commit suicide in their quest to pro-
ect the offspring produced by breeders. However, cooperative
reeding is not confined to insects and occurs in several verte-
rate taxa, including fishes (e.g. cichlids), birds (e.g. corvids and
any passerines in Australia) and mammals (e.g. canids, viver-
ids, humans). Although helping in provisioning the young has
eceived the majority of interest, helpers can also care by ‘nest’
uilding, tending of eggs or young, allo-suckling, as well as car-
ying, huddling and defending (Cockburn, 1998; Dickinson and
atchwell, 2004; Russell, 2004).
The theory of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1963, 1964)
howed that cooperative breeding could (at least in principle) be
xplained within the framework of natural selection acting on
ndividuals, by invoking indirect fitness benefits from helping
losely related kin. Kin selection remained the main theoreti-
al explanation for cooperative breeding for a long time (but
ee Gaston, 1978; Brown, 1987) since, in addition to the com-
elling logic of kin selection theory, empirical studies revealed
hat most helpers are related to the breeders whom they assist
Emlen, 1997; Dickinson and Hatchwell, 2004). Because kin
election was supposed to select against ‘cheating’, empiricists
urned away from questions concerning the evolutionary stabil-
ty of cooperative behaviour (how and why ‘cheats’ that refrain
rom help might be ‘punished’), and focussed instead on the
bservable consequences of helping behaviour. Only in recent
ears scientists have started to question whether kin selection
lone is sufficient to explain cooperative behaviour in coopera-
ive breeding, in particular among vertebrates (Cockburn, 1998;
relatives may counterbalance and even outweigh kin benefits
(West et al., 2002b). Also, it is now apparent that helpers in
cooperative breeding systems are commonly less related to the
breeders than has been generally assumed (Cockburn, 1998;
Clutton-Brock, 2002). While helpers doubtlessly make recog-
nition errors, these are unable to account for all instances of
cooperation between non-kin. Therefore, although the majority
of cooperative breeding systems involve some degree of kinship
(Emlen, 1995), this may often be due to the benefits of philopa-
try and helping rather than the benefits of helping relatives per
se (Clutton-Brock, 2002).
For the above reasons, possible direct benefits of help-
ing have become the focus of greater interest (Gaston, 1978;
Brown, 1987; Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Cockburn, 1998;
Clutton-Brock, 2002; Kokko et al., 2002; Bergmu¨ller et al.,
2005b; Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky, 2005; Komdeur, 2006). There
is consensus that a key factor explaining why helpers delay
dispersal is ecological constraints, which limit the chances to
survive or breed independently (Brockmann, 1997; Hatchwell
and Komdeur, 2000). Hence, although helpers would do better
if they were to succeed in breeding independently, they choose
a ‘best of a bad job’ strategy and stay, either to queue for
the breeding position or to wait until the chances of breeding
independently have increased (Hatchwell and Komdeur, 2000).
However, to explain why helpers stay is not to solve the ques-
tion of why helpers engage in helping, because species exist
in which individuals stay but do not help, and others in which
they help but do not stay (Cockburn, 1998; Russell, 2004). Like-
wise, to explain why helpers stay is not to explain why helpers
reproduce below their potential, since the degree of reproductive
skew varies widely within and between species (Magrath et al.,
2004; Russell, 2004). While there are a few apparent exceptions
(e.g., Emlen and Wrege, 1988; Russell and Hatchwell, 2001),
to understand cooperative behaviour in cooperatively breeding
species it is generally necessary to consider the combined influ-
ences of direct and indirect fitness benefits and their interactions.
However, for our present purpose, explanations of cooperative
breeding based on direct fitness benefits are our main interest,
because of parallels that may be drawn between these concepts
and more general theories of cooperation. Below we briefly
summarise three popular concepts that invoke direct benefits to
account for helping behaviour: pay-to-stay, group augmentation,
2einsohn and Legge, 1999; Clutton-Brock, 2002; Ridley and
utherland, 2002; West et al., 2002b). For instance, it has been
rgued that indirect fitness benefits due to helping are rarely
igh enough to compensate for not breeding independently
Dickinson and Hatchwell, 2004), and competition between
a
h
i
1nd prestige.
The pay-to-stay hypothesis proposes that help provided by
elpers can be viewed as a form of ‘rent’ paid to dominants
n return for being allowed to stay in their territory (Gaston,
978). If helpers do not provide sufficient help, the dominants
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hhould punish helpers (i.e. impose costs) by (a) reinforcing or
ncouraging helping or (b) by evicting them from their terri-
ory. Evidence for pay-to-stay has been scarce (Reeve, 1992;
ulder and Langmore, 1993) but has recently begun to accumu-
ate in a cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher
Balshine-Earn et al., 1998; Bergmu¨ller et al., 2005b; Bergmu¨ller
nd Taborsky, 2005; Stiver et al., 2005).
The group augmentation hypothesis suggests that individuals
urvive or reproduce better in large groups. Hence, individuals
enefit from helping to increase group size, e.g. by caring for
ffspring of others even if they are unrelated or by recruiting new
roup members (Woolfenden, 1975; Brown, 1987; Kokko et al.,
001). Benefits arising from group augmentation can be passive
without investment (i.e. a costly behaviour)), group members
utomatically share benefits (Clutton-Brock, 2002)) if the mere
resence of individuals provides by-product benefits to other
roup members, e.g. due to safety in numbers effects. Alterna-
ively, in active group augmentation investments are involved,
.g. helpers may assist breeders because the offspring they help
o raise will later help them. One example of passive group aug-
entation may be provided by a cooperatively breeding cichlid,
here large groups were more stable between years (Heg et
l., 2005). Also, territories of large groups have been found to
e more densely occupied (less shelters available per helper)
han territories of small groups. This suggests group augmenta-
ion benefits may reduce the need for shelter for each helper and
lso may compensate for increased competition in more densely
ccupied territories (Bergmu¨ller et al., 2005a). However, con-
lusive evidence, particularly on the existence of active group
ugmentation, is currently lacking.
The prestige hypothesis proposes that helping behaviour may
e used as a signal of quality. By helping, helpers thus gain
ocial prestige which may increase the chances of finding a mate
r, more generally, a cooperation partner (Zahavi, 1995). For
nstance, in Arabian babblers (Turdoides squamiceps) individ-
als sometimes reject help they are offered and helpers were
bserved to compete over opportunities to behave altruistically
Carlisle and Zahavi, 1986). This possibility was treated more
enerally with the concept of ‘competitive altruism’ (Roberts,
998): when there is variation between individuals in the ten-
ency or capability to act cooperatively and individuals can
hoose between partners, individuals may compete for partners
y being cooperative.
These direct mechanisms to explain helping in cooperative
reeders were developed without explicit links to existing, sup-
osedly more general theories of cooperation between unrelated
ndividuals (Cahan et al., 2002). As a consequence, the termi-
ology used in the two fields differs and we believe that this is
indering a fruitful exchange of ideas. As it stands, cooperative
reeding has received little attention from theoreticians inter-
sted in the general issue of cooperation among non-relatives,
hile those interested in cooperative breeding have seldom
rawn on general theories from the literature on the evolution of
ooperation.
The aim of this paper is to bridge the gap between theories of
ooperation and of cooperative breeding, and to stimulate greater
ross-disciplinary research between these fields. We suggest to
c
c
aheorists in cooperation research that the scope for testing their
deas in cooperative breeding species is immense, and to empiri-
ists studying cooperative breeding that ideas from cooperation
heory can readily be applied to their study systems, with fruitful
esults. Finally, we show that some phenomena found in coop-
rative breeding species are not fully captured by existing game
heoretic models. However, all mechanisms can be formalised
n game theoretical terms, which should fuel the development of
ore comprehensive models in cooperation theory. Our exam-
les are biased towards vertebrate systems, for kin selection is
till the dominant theory in explaining cooperative breeding in
nvertebrates (Foster et al., 2006), but see (Wilson, 2005; Wilson
nd Ho¨lldobler, 2005). Nevertheless, since cooperative breed-
ng is a continuum (Sherman et al., 1995), much of our paper is
elevant to those interested in social invertebrates.
In Section 1, we provide definitions of some key terms
elevant to cooperation. In Section 2, we introduce four key
uestions that can be used to categorise a wide range of theories
f cooperation. In Section 3, we apply these questions to the con-
epts of pay-to-stay, group augmentation, and social prestige that
ere introduced above. Finally, in Section 4 we suggest promis-
ng issues for future research that attempt to integrate studies
f cooperative breeding into more general discussions of the
volution of cooperation.
. Cooperation
The terms cooperation, mutualism, cooperative behaviour
nd altruism are often used interchangeably, which has led to
onfusion and hinders discussions about the issues concerned
Bshary and Bronstein, 2004; Noe¨, 2006). While we cannot
esolve this issue here, we ourselves will distinguish between
hem, and we therefore begin by explaining our usage. The key
istinction we wish to make is between cooperation (an interac-
ion between two or more individuals) and cooperative behaviour
an action or actions taken by a single individual). In this review
e will focus on the factors that account for the maintenance of
ooperative behaviours in cooperatively breeding species.
We define cooperation as an interaction between individuals
hat results in net benefits for all of the individuals involved.
arasitism is defined as an interaction that yields a net benefit
or one individual but a net cost for other(s), and competition
s an interaction that entails net costs for all players. Follow-
ng traditional terminology (Bronstein, 2001), cooperation refers
nly to intraspecific interactions; we use the term mutualism to
efer to equivalent interspecific interactions. However, we will
ake an exception by using the term ‘by-product mutualism’ in
ntra-specific interactions because it is an established and widely
sed term. In studies of cooperative breeding, researchers have
ocussed mainly on the outcomes of helping. For example, they
ave asked whether helpers confer a net fitness benefit on breed-
rs, comparing the number of offspring raised with or without
elpers. In our terms, they are attempting to determine whether
3ooperative breeding is indeed a form of cooperation.
In general cooperation theory, researchers are more con-
erned about explaining cooperative behaviour, which we define
s an act performed by one individual that increases the fitness
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Dugatkin, 1997; Bergstrom et al., 2003). To name concepts we
consider relevant for cooperative breeders (described in Box 1),
cooperative behaviour may be due to by-product mutualism,
pseudo-reciprocity, negative pseudo-reciprocity (i.e. sanctions),
Box 1.
By-product mutualism results when individu-
als generate beneﬁts to others as a by-product
of performing a self-serving act (West-Eberhard,
1975; Brown, 1983). For example, if two golden
jackals hunting the same prey together are more
successful than each individual hunting alone,
cooperative hunting results in by-product bene-
ﬁts for both (Lamprecht, 1978). Note, however,
that when the beneﬁts resulting from coopera-
tive hunting are due to coordinated behaviour,
the coordination itself can be an investment, and
the contribution to coordination by each partner
needs to be explained (Noe¨, 2006). Pseudo-
reciprocity prevailswhen an individual performs
an investment that promotes the self-serving
behaviour on the part of the receiver which in
turn beneﬁts the investor as a by-product (Connor,
1995a; Leimar and Connor, 2003). An exam-
ple is ants tending mushroom cultures (Mueller
et al., 1998). Ants beneﬁt by improving self-
serving growth of themushroomswhen they later
harvest some of the mushrooms. In negative
pseudo-reciprocity (also termed ‘sanctions’ in
the ecological literature (West et al., 2002a)),
an individual terminates an interaction to avoid
immediate ﬁtness losses if the partner does not
invest (or overexploits) thereby stabilising future
beneﬁts. Yucca trees, for instance, may selec-
tively abort fruits that contain too many larvae
of its pollinator moth as the larvae would eat too
many seeds (Pellmyr and Huth, 1994). In positive
reciprocity individuals exchange investments,
such that the costs of the investments they make
are outweighed by the beneﬁts they receive in
return. ‘Reciprocal altruism’ (Trivers, 1971) applies
when individuals alternately take the role of the
‘altruist’ and the beneﬁciary, while ‘simultane-
ous altruism’ has been formalised in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (IPD, Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981). A key issue is that individuals willing tof another. Turning to the fitness consequences of such an act for
he actor (rather than for the recipient), cooperative behaviour
an be obviously self-serving (Cant and Johnstone, 2006), if it
ntails an immediate increase in the fitness of the actor (irrespec-
ive of the partner’s subsequent behaviour); alternatively, it can
e seemingly altruistic, if it entails at least a temporary reduction
n the fitness of the actor (irrespective of the partner’s subsequent
ehaviour), as in the well-known prisoner’s dilemma game. In
he latter case, we say that the actor invests in another indi-
idual. Any kind of investment is interesting from an adaptive
erspective, as one must ask what selective factors prevent indi-
iduals from withholding their investment and thereby escaping
he fitness cost that it entails.
The term investment applies not only to cooperative
ehaviour in a prisoner’s dilemma, but also to the many instances
n nature in which there is a continuum of possible investments
n a partner (e.g. nectar production, time spent vigilant, food pro-
ided to third party offspring). We have to explain the existence
nd maintenance of any form of investment, independently of
hether the benefits of this investment are accrued immediately,
ith delay or apparently never (as in the case of kin selected
nvestment in which benefits are due to indirect fitness gains).
ltimately, evolutionary theory predicts that any investment is
ikely to prove only apparently altruistic and will be explained
y hidden benefits, e.g. due to kin selection or later reciprocation
Trivers, 1971).
The distinction between cooperative interactions and cooper-
tive behaviours/acts is important, because cooperative breeding
ay well involve many cooperative acts, yet at the same time
ay qualify as parasitism in terms of its net outcome. For
nstance, helpers may perform a cooperative act in providing
breeder’s offspring with food, yet the presence of a helper may
evertheless impose an overall net cost on the breeder.
.1. Cooperation and the problem of outside options
The net cost or benefit of an action must always be defined
elative to some alternative behavioural option. For instance, in
he case of cooperative hunting, an individual may stand to gain
ore by hunting with individual A than by hunting alone, but
t may stand to gain less than by hunting with individual B.
ince benefits or costs are defined relative to specified alterna-
ives, one has to determine and refer to these ‘outside options’.
artner choice is a key component of cooperative interactions
Bshary and Noe¨, 2003) and biological market theory (Noe¨ and
ammerstein, 1995; Noe¨, 2001) explores precisely such effects
f partner choice when trying to understand shifts in invest-
ents or pay off distributions between partners. Hence, a key
hallenge for both theoreticians and empiricists will be to deter-
ine the alternatives available to individuals compared to what
hey actually do. In this respect, a useful definition of cooperative
ehaviour is: an individual behaves cooperatively if the resulting
ayoff for its partner is higher than the average payoff for the
elevant type of interaction (Bull and Rice, 1991). According to
his definition, even parasites can behave cooperatively if they
xploit their host less than do their conspecifics, even though the
utcome would still be called parasitism.. Concepts of cooperation and building blocks
Cooperation theory has suggested a large number of mech-
nisms that might potentially maintain cooperative behaviour
etween unrelated individuals, applicable to both intraspe-
ific cooperation and interspecific mutualism (Connor, 1995a,b;
4cooperate must be able to control the behaviour
of their partner to avoid being exploited by
self-serving individuals. While the IPD has been
Box 1 (Continued )
popular among theoreticians for a long time, its
usefulness appears to be limited as there are still
remarkably few empirical examples (summarized
by Dugatkin, 1997) and several assumptionsmade
by the IPD regarding game structures are vio-
lated in most real life interactions (Roberts, 1998;
Hammerstein, 2003; Bshary and Bronstein, 2004;
Noe¨, 2006). In contrast, parcelling an interaction
into several small cooperation bouts (Connor,
1995a) may solve the problem of cheating in
reciprocal interactions in a more simple way
because it automatically secures further receiving.
The key point is that at each moment of deci-
sion, cheating is an unproﬁtable option because
the relatively small beneﬁt of cheating (receiv-
ing a small free beneﬁt) is outweighed by the
consequences of terminating the interaction (a
loss of many small future beneﬁts). Reciprocal
grooming in impalas (Hart et al., 1992) may be
a good example of parcelling. Negative reci-
procity promotes investment by an actor who
thereby avoids a negative response (punishment)
to any failure to invest (cheating) (Clutton-Brock
and Parker, 1995). For instance a cleaner ﬁsh that
cheats a resident client ﬁsh by biting it to get
the more preferred mucus rather than merely
removing parasites will sometimes be chased by
the victim. Subsequently, the punished cleaner
will give this client a particularly good service
during the next interaction (Bshary and Grutter,
2002b; Bshary and Grutter, 2005). In contrast to
reciprocal altruism in which the exchange of ben-
eﬁcial acts maintains cooperation, cooperative
behaviour resulting from punishment depends
on threat. Therefore, single acts of punishment
combined with communication (i.e. signalling
of threat) may promote long-term cooperative
behaviour even if reinforcement only takes place
infrequently (Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky, 2005). In
indirect reciprocity based on image scoring
(Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998),
individuals invest because this increases the prob-
ability that observers will invest in them in the
future. Investment thus is a consequence of the
increase in image or reputation in the origi-
nal investor. Currently, there is evidence only in
humans for this particular explanation of coop-
erative behaviour (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000).
In theory, also negative indirect reciprocity
based on image scoring due to seemingly spiteful
behaviour towards others may promote coopera-
tive behaviour because it discourages observers
from acting non-cooperatively towards the perpe-
trator (Johnstone and Bshary, 2004).
Fig. 1. Hierarchical classification of mechanisms that can maintain coopera-
tive behaviour. By-product mutualism does not involve [1] investments that
are directed towards others. An investment may be performed to obtain benefits
resulting from the self-serving behaviour of the receiver (i.e. pseudo-reciprocity),
without eliciting return investment. Alternatively, an investment may be [2] made
in expectation of an investment in return, resulting in reciprocity. The investor
may obtain benefits [3] either directly or indirectly (i.e. via third parties). [4]
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5ooperative behaviour may be stabilised by costly acts or by-products resulting
rom self-serving responses by the receiver (or third parties) that have either
ositive (+) or negative (−) effects on the partner.
ositive reciprocity, negative reciprocity (i.e. punishment) or
ndirect reciprocity.
At first sight, this plethora of concepts seems confusing.
owever, we will show that all can simply be categorised by
sking four key questions. We are fully aware that our approach
epresents a simplification. Further questions could be asked
nd a more detailed classification developed (e.g. Bshary and
ronstein, 2004). We will address some of these additional
ssues in the discussion. Here, however, we develop a sim-
le, hierarchical classification of explanations for cooperative
ehaviour based on our four key questions (Fig. 1). (1) The first
uestion to ask is whether or not an individual invests in a part-
er. (2) Second, if investment by one or both partners occurs,
ne has to ask whether the investment elicits a return investment
r not. (3) Third, the returns on an investment may be provided
irectly by the beneficiary or indirectly via third parties. (4)
ourth, cooperative behaviour may be stabilised due to positive
r negative effects of an individual on a partner.
.1. Investment (a costly act)
Like previous authors, we define an investment as a costly
ehaviour which benefits others (Connor, 1995b; Bshary and
ronstein, 2004). An investment in this sense is synonymous
ith a temporarily altruistic act. We add to this definition that
nvestments are made in ‘expectation’ of a return, that is, each
nvestment is ultimately performed to promote own interests.
cooperative interaction without investments towards other
ndividuals involved is called by-product mutualism.
.2. Return investment (a costly response)In general, investments promote own interests by altering the
ehaviour of the receiver. An individual may invest (a) to gain
ccess to predictable benefits (assured returns) or (b) in ‘expec-
ation’ of an investment in return. (a) In pseudo-reciprocity an
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(nvestment results in predictable benefits because it enhances the
y-product benefits that accrue due to the self-serving behaviour
f the receiver (not a return investment). Note, that at least in
heory (we do not know of any example) both partners may
ndependently invest into the partner to gain by-product returns
2-way pseudo-reciprocity, Leimar and Connor, 2003), which
ould be difficult to distinguish from true reciprocity in prac-
ice. (b) In reciprocity, an investment is favoured due to the
ostly response (return investment) of the receiver. An invest-
ent of this kind does not lead to predictable benefits because
he receiver also has the option of whether or not to invest in a
esponse. Hence, the risk of cheating arises and furthermore the
ossibility for negotiations and regulation of investments based
n the expected benefit.
.3. Direct or indirect interactions
Interactions are direct if the beneficial returns of an invest-
ent are due to the response of the recipient, as for instance in
eciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Alternatively, an interaction
s termed ‘indirect’ if an individual A that helps B will gain
rom an investment made by a third party C, e.g. as is the case
n indirect reciprocity based on image scoring.
.4. Positive or negative control mechanism
If an individual (or a third party) responds to an investment by
ncreasing the fitness of the investor (either through a by-product
r through a return investment), the stability of cooperative
ehaviour is based on reward. We call this a ‘positive control
echanism’. If instead an individual decreases the fitness of a
artner (either through a by-product or through punishment),
hereby avoiding further fitness reducing acts by a partner, we
se the term ‘negative control mechanism’.
In negative pseudo-reciprocity an individual reduces the fit-
ess of a partner as a by-product of a self-serving act thereby
voiding further fitness losses. In contrast, in negative reciprocity
unishment is a costly response to cheating and these costs have
o be compensated by future beneﬁts.
In the next major part of this paper, we will apply the param-
ter tree (Fig. 1) to evaluate what kind of mechanisms may
romote cooperative behaviour in cooperative breeding. As we
hall see, some hitherto unexplored parameter combinations
ay be of major interest to understand cooperative breeding.
. Categorising theories of cooperative breeding
We focus on three explanations that have been put forward to
xplain investments by helpers in addition to kin selection argu-
ents: pay-to-stay, group augmentation and social prestige. We
ill classify these concepts according to the scheme introduced
bove..1. Pay-to-stay
Consider a subordinate that imposes some cost on an unre-
ated breeder by remaining in the breeder’s territory. The breederay tolerate the presence of the helper in its territory (an invest-
ent) in expectation that the helper will help. If the helper
educes or stops helping, the dominant will punish the helper. In
esponse, the helper performs an investment in expectation that
his will avoid future punishment (Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky,
005). This is therefore an instance of negative reciprocity.
f a helper does not help, the dominant may increase punish-
ent which eventually may lead to expulsion. Interestingly,
hen punishment actually involves the threat of expulsion the
ooperation mechanism may shift from negative reciprocity to
egative pseudo-reciprocity. This is because under these cir-
umstances, the dominant invests effort in expelling the helper
n order to obtain the by-product benefit of terminating the costs
hat the latter would otherwise impose by its presence. How-
ver, it is noteworthy that cooperative behaviour due to negative
seudo-reciprocity or negative reciprocity is based on threat.
ooperation prevails as long as the net outcome remains bene-
cial for both parties. However, frequent punishment may shift
he interaction towards parasitism or competition.
.2. Group augmentation
Group augmentation may involve a number of mechanisms
f cooperation, which can be difficult to separate in practise:
1) By-product mutualism: In ‘passive’ group augmentation
individuals profit from by-product benefits conferred by the
mere presence of other group members. As this involves
no investments between group members it constitutes a by-
product mutualism. For example, helpers may contribute
to territory defence because of direct self-serving benefits
(e.g. to reduce own predation risk), but their behaviour may
benefit others as a by-product.
2) Pseudo-reciprocity: In ‘active’ group augmentation an unre-
lated subordinate may provision offspring because the
survival of those young provides by-product benefits to the
helper, as a result of the increase in group size. In this case
the helper clearly invests in the offspring. The offspring will
make use of this investment in a self-serving way, i.e. grow
and increase own survival. In turn, the self-serving survival
of the offspring increases the fitness of the helper as a by-
product, e.g. due to reduced risk of predation (Heg et al.,
2004).
3) Indirect reciprocity without image scoring: Individuals (cur-
rently helpers) may help to recruit new group members
who will later actively help them to raise their offspring,
resulting in cross generational reciprocation (also ‘delayed
reciprocity’ (Ligon and Ligon, 1978; Wiley and Rabenold,
1984); ‘generational mutualism’ (Brown, 1987)). In this sce-
nario helpers providing food for young will later become
indirect receivers of help when they are breeders themselves.
According to the decision tree, a helper invests (increases
the survival of young) in expectation that the recipient will
6later indirectly invest in return (costly response) by help-
ing to raise the former helper’s offspring later. No image
scoring is involved: boosting the survival of young sim-
ply increases the probability that they will be present to
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Fig. 2. (A) pay-to-stay corresponds to negative reciprocity (reinforcement)
and negative pseudo-reciprocity (helper expelled), (B) group augmentation
potentially involves a number of mechanisms (by-product mutualism, pseudo-
reciprocity, indirect reciprocity without image scoring (cross-generational)), and
(C) prestige corresponds to indirect pseudo-reciprocity or indirect reciprocity
with image scoring. In addition to the four questions introduced previously
(see Fig. 1), we need to ask an additional question to distinguish between two
types of indirect reciprocity: do individuals rely on information about the past
behaviour of others (public information)? [5] Cross-generational reciprocity
does not require such information, whereas image scoring does. An asterix (*)
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7feed the actor’s offspring (in expectation, in turn, that their
own offspring will benefit from the subsequent presence of
the actor’s young). Interestingly, as each decision to invest
is based on the expectation of future benefits, there is no
threat of being cheated: a helper that does not help to raise
offspring will have less helpers available to help to raise its
own offspring. This explanation for helping relies on helpers
being able to gain a breeding position in the same group in
which they help.
.3. Prestige
Zahavi (1995) suggested that Arabian babbler helpers com-
ete among each other to assist breeders’ offspring in order to
dvertise their genetic quality and thereby gain social prestige.
Prestige and image scoring differ in that the former was pro-
osed as a signal of individual genetic quality (a handicap),
hereas image scoring is based only on an individual’s past
ooperative behaviours towards third parties and assumes no
ariation in quality between individuals (Lotem et al., 2003). In
oth cases helping behaviour translates into a gain in reputa-
ion that serves to obtain benefits from third parties. Therefore,
s regards the signalling effect of helping, prestige and indi-
ect reciprocity based on image scoring are equivalent (Zahavi,
995; Roberts, 1998; Lotem et al., 2003). However, with regards
o the mechanism of cooperation involved, the crucial question
o ask is whether the actor benefits as a result of (a) self-serving
ehaviour or (b) investment by observers.
(a) A female may choose a helper as a mate because the fact that
it helps is a signal of quality that will translate into superior
offspring. As a female has a self-serving interest in obtaining
a high-quality mate, a helper invests in caring for young
to indirectly obtain the by-product benefits resulting from
the self-serving behaviour of the female. This constitutes
indirect pseudo-reciprocity.
b) Reputation may, on the other hand, serve to elicit costly
help or tolerance from dominants, which stand to gain by
encouraging further helping. In this case, helping the young
of others can be an investment in expectation of indirect
investment in return due to a gain in reputation. For exam-
ple, breeders may allow or tolerate direct reproduction by
a helper that has a reputation for helping. This constitutes
indirect reciprocity based on image scoring (Lotem et al.,
2003).
Below we summarize the connections between concepts in
ooperative breeding and cooperation theory (Fig. 2). Based on
he above analysis we need to extend the simple decision tree
resented before. Also, the concepts we have reviewed include
echanisms that have not yet been explored in general models
or the evolution of cooperation.. Discussion
Categorising mechanisms for the maintenance of coopera-
ive behaviour by means of a decision tree, we have emphasised
c
a
b
tndicates parameter combinations for mechanisms of cooperation that have not
et been explored theoretically.
our key issues: the presence or absence of investment, return
nvestment, direct or indirect interactions and positive or neg-
tive control mechanism. We suggest that these issues capture
he key differences between some main concepts in the litera-
ure on the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives and
xplain how these concepts are linked. We then turned to three
f the most popular hypotheses involving direct benefits in the
ooperative breeding literature, namely ‘pay-to-stay’, ‘group
ugmentation’ and ‘social prestige’. Our analyses indicate that
a) these hypotheses can be categorised in the same way as
ore general mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperation,
ut that (b) each hypothesis may in fact subsume several dis-
inct mechanisms. The first result appears to justify a closer
ntegration of studies of cooperative breeding with analyses of
he evolution of cooperation. Cooperative breeding provides an
deal context in which to study the partner control mechanisms
hat promote cooperative behaviour in animals. Hence, it is puz-
ling that the rich empirical evidence in this field has remained
argely separated from cooperation theory (but see Brown, 1987;
lutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Connor, 1995b; Clutton-Brock,
002). Despite the many aspects of cooperative behaviour that
re potentially involved in cooperative breeding, reviews of the
volution of cooperation tend to ignore cooperative breeding or
xplain it as a whole in terms of one particular mechanism, e.g.
y-product mutualism (Sachs et al., 2004). We hope that this
ill change in the future. Our second result may alert empiri-
ists to the fact that current theories of cooperative breeding
re poorly defined. Each of the issues we have addressed must
e carefully investigated to allow a thorough understanding of
he game structure. In particular, group augmentation has to
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ie explored in much more detail if we are to understand fully
he evolutionary stability of investments in the system under
tudy. Other concepts proposed in the cooperative breeding lit-
rature may also be analysed in the same way in the future,
ncluding task sharing (Taborsky, 1994; Lacey and Sherman,
997; Clutton-Brock et al., 2003; Arnold et al., 2005), redi-
ected helping (Emlen, 1982; Dickinson and Hatchwell, 2004),
trategic between group dispersal (Bergmu¨ller et al., 2005a),
oad lightening (Crick, 1992; Heinsohn, 2004), kinship deceit
Connor and Curry, 1995), parental facilitation (of territorial
nheritance) (Brown and Brown, 1984), skill acquisition (Brown,
987; Komdeur, 1996) and between group competition (Brooke
nd Hartley, 1995; Cockburn, 1998).
.1. How to study cooperative behaviour in cooperative
reeders?
The historical separation between cooperation and coop-
rative breeding seems at least partly due to differences in
ethodology. Empirical studies on cooperative breeding focus
n ecological parameters and final net outcomes but usually not
n the exchange of cooperative behaviours. Measured param-
ters include habitat saturation, dispersal patterns, survival
robabilities of breeders, helpers and offspring, reproductive
uccess of breeders with and without helpers, and finally direct
omparisons of the inclusive fitness of same aged individuals
hat either help or breed independently. This approach differs
arkedly from empirical studies in general cooperation research
n which researchers focus on the maintenance of cooperative
ehaviour studying the behaviour of individuals in very spe-
ific situations. The responses of individuals to each others’
ehaviour are then used to deduce the strategies individuals
re using. This step is important as selection does not act at
he level of interactions, but at the level of individual strate-
ies (Noe¨, 2006). With this approach, fitness is never measured
irectly. Instead, the long-term association is split into multiple
xchanges. Using this approach in cooperative breeding, one
ould observe how a breeder responds each time a helper pro-
ides food to its offspring, and each time the helper swallows
he food itself. An experimental approach would be to induce a
hange in frequency of the two behaviours and to observe the
eaction of the breeder (Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky, 2005) (or vice
ersa, to manipulate the behaviour of the breeder, and observe
he helper’s response). Clearly, the fitness payoff of each single
elper decision is small for any of the players involved (helper,
reeder, offspring). However, it is simple to construct a payoff
atrix in which the value is positive (versus negative) for the
elper if it swallows the food (versus delivers the food to the
ffspring) and positive (versus negative) for the breeder if the
elper delivers the food (versus swallows the food). After a long
eries of interactions the sum of the payoffs should have a sub-
tantial impact on the fitness of the players. In this case, helpers
in particular unrelated helpers but possibly also related ones)
ay increase their fitness by not providing any food, forcing
reeders to find ways to control helper behaviour to ensure a
ignificant contribution. As a consequence, one would expect to
bserve behavioural strategies of breeders that serve to promote
m
d
t
telp, either by responding favourably to a helper that feeds the
hicks or by inflicting some cost on a helper that fails to deliver
ood.
.2. New avenues for theoretical research
Our approach highlights the need for specific models of
ooperative behaviours involved in cooperative breeding. Dur-
ng our analysis several mechanisms emerged that seem to
ccur in cooperative breeding systems but have not yet been
xplored theoretically: indirect pseudo-reciprocity, negative
seudo-reciprocity and indirect reciprocity without image scor-
ng (across generations). Even more importantly, it will be a
hallenge for theoreticians to explore the conditions favouring
lternative mechanisms. For example, under which conditions
hould we expect negative reciprocity (punishment) instead of
egative pseudo-reciprocity (eviction)? In addition, there are a
umber of as yet unresolved issues that need to be addressed.
hree key issues are N-player interactions, the influence of
utside options and symmetric versus asymmetric strategy
ets. We consider it crucial that empiricists collaborate with
heoreticians on these issues to generate a firm theoretical
asis that closely corresponds to the phenomena observable in
ature.
.3. N-player cooperation
Although models of cooperation often focus on interactions
etween two individuals, cooperation may involve more than
wo individuals, resulting in N-player games. Almost by defini-
ion, cooperative breeding involves multiple players contributing
o raising offspring, territory defence or other tasks. The con-
eptual problem with N-player cooperation is that individuals
ypically invest into common goods (the offspring, a territory,
rotection) that are shared among all group members. Theory
redicts that cooperation should break down under these cir-
umstances, a phenomenon first described as the ‘tragedy of
he commons’ (Hardin, 1968). This is because no individual
hould invest into a common good if others (i.e. free-riders)
ould profit from this investment without contributing them-
elves. Despite this theoretical prediction, we often observe
ndividuals investing in common goods in nature, for instance in
ooperative territory defence, cooperative hunting or coopera-
ive breeding. Current solutions to the tragedy of the commons in
ommon goods games include, for instance, reputation (Milinski
t al., 2002), and population dynamics in structured populations
Killingback et al., 2006 and cited references).
In cooperative breeders, many phenomena are for simplicity
ften treated as interactions between two individuals. For exam-
le, helpers may mainly interact with the breeder of the same
ex, with helper contributions depending on the outcome of these
nteractions. On the other hand, many situations clearly involve
nteractions between more than two individuals, although it
8ight be often difficult to determine which individuals actually
o interact at any given point of time. Some phenomena appear
o involve investment in a common good, e.g. the offspring or a
erritory. For instance, in bell miners (Manorina melanophrys)
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1elpers regularly provision young of different breeding pairs
nd also exhibit extreme cooperative group-defence, sometimes
lmost totally excluding other avian species from the colony’s
erritory (Clarke and Fitzgerald, 1994). Categorising aspects
f cooperative breeding as 2-player or N-player interactions
akes a crucial difference with regards to cooperation the-
ry. Therefore, examples like this suggest that more research
s needed to determine in which instances N-player models are
ppropriate.
.4. Outside options: biological market theory
Including the option to choose between partners (one possi-
le outside option) remains a key challenge for future models
f cooperation and is important for our understanding of payoff
tructures in cooperatively breeding systems. Besides influenc-
ng whether an individual will cooperate or not, choice options
ay also explain how much an individual will invest. For exam-
le, Noe¨ (1990) witnessed a period in which a male baboon
as the only possible alliance partner for two other males in the
roup. During this time period, the ‘veto-player’ male reaped
lmost all the benefits from the successful coalitions he engaged
n with his two partners. In the cleaning mutualism, there is
vidence that a shift from no partner choice to partner choice
ields a shift from punishment as a control mechanism to part-
er switching (Bshary and Grutter, 2002a; Bshary and Scha¨ffer,
002). According to our classification tree, partner switching
s an example of negative pseudo-reciprocity: a lack of invest-
ent by the cleaner leads the client to self-servingly choose
nother cleaner (in expectation of a better service), while its
urrent cleaner incurs a cost (loss of a client) as a by-product.
hus, partner choice may influence payoff distributions among
artners and may be an important mechanism in preventing part-
ers from reducing their investment. We did not include partner
hoice as one of the building blocks in our decision tree because
t may act in combination with any other mechanism in which
nvestments are involved.
In cooperative breeders partner choice may have important
onsequences, for instance when helpers have the option to
trategically switch to another group (Noe¨ et al., 1991). Accord-
ng to biological market theory (Noe¨ and Hammerstein, 1995;
oe¨, 2001) this option allows helpers to trade their helping
ontributions for acceptance in a territory that offers better con-
itions, e.g. due to a shorter queue for the breeding position
r a lower workload than in the current group (Bergmu¨ller et
l., 2005a). Likewise, when breeders are in need of helpers
hey should adjust the level of help they demand from their
elpers in order to forestall their dispersal when favourable
lternatives are available. Therefore, researchers need to ask
ow easily breeders could choose other helpers and how eas-
ly helpers could switch to other breeders. The options for both
ides are likely to change between years, depending on the
atio of breeders and helpers. Also, a helper’s option to breed
ndependently should influence the net investment it makes
Bergmu¨ller et al., 2005b). Reproductive skew theory addresses
his last issue but often without using biological market termi-
ology.
r
M
i
i.5. Symmetric or asymmetric relationships and
nteractions
Classic cooperation theories like the prisoner’s dilemma are
uilt on the assumption that both players have identical strategic
ptions (to cooperate or to cheat) and hence have identical prob-
ems to solve, possess identical power or are in identical states.
owever, asymmetries in these aspects are likely to be the norm
ather than the exception in nature, e.g. when dominance hier-
rchies are involved or individuals vary in their age, condition
r prior experience. Asymmetries between partners with respect
o power may create asymmetries in the option to use punish-
ent against cheating. However, asymmetries have as yet not
een fully addressed in cooperation theory. Cooperative breed-
ng is obviously full of asymmetries, most evidently, breeders
re generally dominant over helpers. This often involves asym-
etries in the currencies exchanged, for instance helpers helping
n exchange for tolerance by the breeders. Another key asym-
etry concerns the strategic options of breeder and helper. For
larity, let us assume that a helper is unrelated to breeders and
ffspring. In the helper’s ideal world, it could use the resources of
he territory without providing any help. In other words, it would
enefit from cheating. The breeder, however, lacks the option to
heat the helper in return. The breeder may use aggression to
nforce investment by the helper, but only up to the point where
helper prefers to leave. The breeder may also be able to evict
helper from the territory. However, this is not cheating, as the
reeder cannot remove the helper and receive additional help at
he same time. Pay-to-stay and biological market models incor-
orate such asymmetries but otherwise such assumptions are still
are in cooperation theory (but see Johnstone and Bshary, 2002).
.6. Interactions of kin based and non-kin based
ooperation
Mechanisms that provide direct and indirect benefits to
elpers or dominants are for simplicity often regarded in iso-
ation. However, it is clear that both types of mechanisms may
ften interact or act in parallel (Lehmann and Keller, 2006). One
ay to disentangle these mechanisms is to investigate species
n which related and unrelated helpers are present simultane-
usly and to analyse the amount of help provided by both types.
hile related helpers are already an indirect benefit to dominants
y their mere existence, unrelated helpers may be expected to
ngage more extensively in helping to compensate for the pos-
ible costs they impose on the breeders. However, in pied king
shers, for instance, unrelated secondary helpers help less than
elated primary helpers (Reyer, 1984). Several studies of coop-
rative birds and mammals have shown that helpers which are
nrelated to the young they are raising invest equally as closely
elated helpers (Dunn et al., 1995; Magrath and Whittingham,
997; Clutton-Brock et al., 2000).
One framework to treat interactions between direct and indi-
9ect benefits are reproductive skew models (Johnstone, 2000;
agrath et al., 2004). We propose future theoretical and empir-
cal studies are needed to determine the relative importance of
nvestments due to direct, indirect or combined returns.
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B.7. Kinship, interdependence and the value of lasting
ssociations
Kinship has been interpreted recently as a special case of
nterdependence (the fitness of one individual depends on the fit-
ess of another), resulting in an interest or ‘stake’ of the altruist
n the fitness of the beneficiary (Roberts, 2005). While inclusive
tness theory addresses interdependence solely with respect to
enetic relatedness, it can also prevail in general if an altruist
enefits as a secondary consequence of helping (i.e. due to a
y-product). Therefore, altruistic behaviours can be favoured if
heir costs are outweighed by the altruist’s stake in the bene-
ciary. According to this view, an investment in a relative is
special case of pseudo-reciprocity, where the resulting by-
roduct benefits are due to the genetic benefits accrued through
he increased fitness of the recipient.
Interdependence between individuals should have general
mplications for the stability of cooperative behaviour. It may
xplain individual investments, even if they do not result in
irect responses on investments (i.e. like in reciprocity). This is
he case, for instance, when individuals live in the same groups
nd benefit from the mere presence of others (e.g. by preda-
or dilution) or when social relationships have a value (Aureli,
997), e.g. when individuals are interdependent due to famil-
arity (Bergmu¨ller et al., 2005a) or social bonds (Brown, 1987).
his should be relevant in group living animals like cooperative
reeders, where investments may often be based on lasting rela-
ionships between individuals who are concerned with the costs
nd benefits of interactions on a much longer time scale than that
f a single exchange (Packer and Pusey, 1997; van Schaik and
appeler, 2006). Therefore, interdependencies between interac-
ion partners such as social relationships have to be taken into
ccount when using a game theoretical approach, as they may
nfluence an individual’s investment and choice of behaviour in
ny given situation.
. Conclusions
We have attempted to relate existing theories for the evolution
f cooperation and concepts from the distinct field of coopera-
ive breeding. We suggest that this integrative approach may be
seful in creating a unified framework that allows us to anal-
se different forms of cooperation in a more consistent way. We
mphasise that cooperative breeding offers an ideal context in
hich to test more general theories of cooperation, provided that
t is studied at all the appropriate levels, i.e. also focusing on the
esponses of individuals to changes in the behaviour of others,
nd not simply on the net outcome of the interaction. Finally,
e believe that our systematic approach highlights a number of
ssues (both theoretical and empirical) that remain to be tackled
efore a comprehensive understanding of cooperation, including
ooperative breeding, can be achieved.cknowledgements
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